a patch for an Outlook vulnerability first reportedVulnerability-related.DiscoverVulnerabilityin late 2016 , but the patch has been deemedVulnerability-related.PatchVulnerabilityincomplete and additional workarounds are needed , according to the security researcher who discoveredVulnerability-related.DiscoverVulnerabilityit . Yesterday 's April 2018 Patch Tuesday updates train included a fix for CVE-2018-0950 , a vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook discoveredVulnerability-related.DiscoverVulnerabilityby Will Dormann , a vulnerability analyst at the CERT Coordination Center ( CERT/CC ) . Outlook retrieves remote OLE content without prompting According to Dormann , the main problem with CVE-2018-0950 is that Microsoft Outlook will automatically render the content of remote OLE objects embedded inside rich formatted emails without prompting the user , something that Microsoft does in other Office apps such as Word , Excel , and PowerPoint . This leads to a slew of problems that come from automatically rendering OLE objects , a common attack vector for malware authors . Microsoft patches SMB attack vector only In a CERT/CC vulnerability note , Dormann says he notified Microsoft of Outlook 's propensity for loading OLE objects without alerting users in November 2016 . After almost 18 months , the company finally issuedVulnerability-related.PatchVulnerabilitya patch for the reported issue , but Dormann says the patch does not addressVulnerability-related.PatchVulnerabilitythe problem at the core of the issue . According to Microsoft , the CVE-2018-0950 patch deliveredVulnerability-related.PatchVulnerabilityyesterday only blocks Outlook from initiating SMB connections when previewing rich formatted emails . Dormann points out that Outlook still does not prompt user for permission to render OLE objects for email previews . Furthermore , the researcher also highlights that there are other ways of obtaining the NTLM hashes , such as embedding UNC links to SMB servers inside the email , links that Outlook will automatically make clickable . `` If a user clicks such a link , the impact will be the same as with this vulnerability , '' Dormann says . But even this incomplete patch is good news . This means that while Outlook will continue to render OLE objects inside email previews , at least these objects ca n't be used to steal NTLM hashes via SMB anymore . To avoid attackers from getting their hands on NTLM hashes via SMB altogether , the expert recommends that system administrators apply additional OS-level workarounds ,
Netskope Threat Research Labs has observed phishing attacksAttack.Phishingusing decoy PDF files , URL redirection , and Cloud Storage services to infect users and propagate malware . Because many organizations have default “ allow ” security policies for popular Cloud Storage services and PDF readers to let users take advantage of these useful services , these attacks pass through the corporate network to end users ’ machines undetected . Moreover , as users collaborate and share through cloud services , these malicious files posing asAttack.PhishingPDFs “ fan out ” to shared users , creating a secondary propagation vector . We are calling this the “ CloudPhishing Fan-out EffectAttack.Phishing” . In this blog , we will detail the insidious nature of CloudPhishingAttack.Phishingand the secondary fan-out using two recently detected cases . We will also illustrate how an attack – even if unsuccessful – may leave the target vulnerable to future attacks . Additionally , we will outline the Netskope protection stance , and general best practices to handle this attack . The CloudPhishing fan-out effectAttack.Phishingoccurs when a victim inadvertently shares the phishing document with colleagues , whether internal or external , via a cloud service . This is particularly insidious in the cloud , as shared users lose the context of the document ’ s external origin and may trust the internally shared document as if it were created internally . Other than having the file shared in OneDrive , the SaaS application is unrelated to the attack . This threat , seen in one of our customer environments , is detected by Netskope Active Threat Protection as Backdoor.Phishing.FW . The decoy PDF is usually deliveredAttack.Phishingas an email attachment named , “ invoice ” in an attempt to lureAttack.Phishingthe victim into executing the file . This , in effect , weakens the security posture of the endpoint against future attacks . The decoy PDF connects to the TinyURL link , http : //TinyURL [ . The attacker used the TinyURL link as an evasive tactic to hide the original link . At the time of analysis , the web page was down and not serving any content . This might be because the web page was removed or renamed . Our analysis showed that the Adobe Acrobat Reader prompts a security warning to the user when the document connects to a link . This feature allows any URL related to the domain that is on the allowed list . Based on the behavior seen in the latest version of the Adobe Acrobat Reader , we recommend users un-check the “ Remember this action… ” option while allowing the PDF to connect to an external link . We also advise users to hover their mouse over the hyperlink to confirm the link and also regularly monitor managed Internet access settings in the PDF reader ’ s Trust Manager . The phishing PDF decoys showcase the use of URL redirectors and cloud services , and also a secondary propagation vector within the shared users leading to the CloudPhishing fan-outAttack.Phishing. By taking advantage of the “ default allow ” action in popular PDF readers , the attacker can easily deploy multiple attacks without getting the security warning after the first alert . This makes the attacker effectively a host for phishing pages or malicious payloads using URL redirection services and Cloud Storage services