The extortion attemptAttack.Ransomtook place on January 11 , the first day some Lloyds Bank customers experienced short-lived problems with accessing their online banking portals . Customers continued to report brief outages in the following two days . On the third day , on Friday , January 13 , Bleeping Computer received two separate tips , via email and Twitter , from two hackers that appeared to know each other . Hacker # 1 sent Bleeping Computer a link to a PasteBin page that contained a copy of an email the group allegedly sent to a high-ranking Lloyds Bank manager . The email , pictured below , contained a ransom demandAttack.Ransomdisguised as a `` consultancy fee '' the group was askingAttack.Ransomto revealVulnerability-related.DiscoverVulnerability`` security issues '' that affectedVulnerability-related.DiscoverVulnerabilityLloyd Bank 's online banking portals . The hackers were asking forAttack.Ransom100 Bitcoin ( £75,000 / $ 94,000 ) . `` Once paid , the services will be back online , you will get a list of flaws related to both services , along with our disappearance , '' the email reads . A second hacker reached out via Twitter a few hours later and was surprised to find out that his colleague already shared the PasteBin link , confirming they knew each other . Hacker # 2 proceeded to provide a demo that allegedly showed they were behind the Lloyds Bank outages . The demo was specific with how hackers demonstrate they are behind DDoS attacks . Hacker # 2 asked your reporter and other journalists to access Lloyds Bank online portals before his attack , to prove the service was running , and during his attack , to show that he was the one causing the issues .
An alarming number of Android VPNs are providing a decidedly false sense of security to users , especially those living in areas where communication is censored or technology is crucial to the privacy and physical security . A study published recently identified a number of shortcomings common to high percentages of 238 mobile VPN apps analyzed by a handful of researchers . Users downloading and installing these apps expecting secure communication and connections to private networks are instead using apps that lack encryption , are infected with malware , intercept TLS traffic , track user activity , and manipulate HTTP traffic . “ Our experiments revealVulnerability-related.DiscoverVulnerabilityseveral instances of VPN apps that expose users to serious privacy and security vulnerabilities , such as use of insecure VPN tunneling protocols , as well as IPv6 and DNS traffic leakage , ” said researchers Muhammad Ikram , Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez , Suranga Seneviratne , Mohamed Ali Kaafar and Vern Paxson , representing Australia ’ s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization ( AU-CSIRO ) , the University of South Wales , and the International Computer Science Institute at the University of California at Berkeley . Their findings and methodology can be found in a paper : “ An Analysis of the Privacy and Security Risks of Android VPN Permission-enabled Apps ” . “ We also report on a number of apps actively performing TLS interception . Of particular concern are instances of apps that inject JavaScript programs for tracking , advertising , and for redirecting e-commerce traffic to external partners , ” they said . The researchers identifiedVulnerability-related.DiscoverVulnerabilitya core weakness commonly abused in many of the apps called the BIND_VPN_SERVICE , native platform support for VPN clients introduced by Google in 2011 in Android 4.0 . BIND_VPN_SERVICE is used by developers in the creation of clients to intercept , manipulate and forward traffic to a remote proxy or VPN server , or to implement proxies in localhost , the researchers said . It ’ s a powerful Android service that can be easily abused , depending on intent . The paper describes how the Android VPN API exposes a network interface to a requesting app and routes traffic from a phone or tablet to the requesting app . Developers must declare access to the BIND_VPN_SERVICE in the AndroidManifest file , but to only one app at a time . The potential for abuse is high any time traffic is re-routed ; Android counters this with two warnings informing the user that a virtual network interface has been created and remains active .